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 1. Introduction 
 
An efficient and stable financial system is a crucial ingredient for economic development 
and growth. A broad consensus exists in the literature that such a system contributes to an 
efficient allocation of real economic resources across time and space and an efficient 
management of wealth and capital accumulation. In most developed countries, banks – 
besides financial markets – play a crucial role as intermediary institutions in the process 
of asset allocation. Correspondingly, the efficiency and stability of the banking system is 
a crucial concern for monetary and supervisory authorities.  
  An important issue in this respect is how and to what extent a trade-off exists 
between efficiency on the one hand and stability on the other. Focusing on the banking 
sector, market entry and exit should be a normal phenomenon as in any other industry. 
That is, competition between banks should be encouraged to allow the market as a whole 
to become more efficient. In the European context, this was the major goal of the creation 
of the common market for financial products and services in the early 1990s. As a result, 
banks from any EU country can operate now throughout the EU with a single banking 
licence. Financial integration was hypothesized to result in more competition and higher 
efficiency. Obviously, individual under-performing banks then can default in the process.  
However, the occurrence of outright bank failure in the European financial system 
is a rare event. Nevertheless, the recent past has shown a number of situations when 
financial markets seem to have been considerably preoccupied by the financial soundness 
of several European banks.
1 Situations of systemic financial distress remain a concrete 
threat to both markets and supervisory authorities.  Although the default of an individual 
bank is not the issue here, the risk of contagion makes both markets and supervisory 
authorities wary of such events. As a result, supervision on a micro-level is used to 
promote financial stability and to avoid systemic macro-instability.
2  
Given the importance of systemic financial stability and the possible relation 
between individual bank’s fragility to economic shocks and the system’s overall 
                                                 
1 See for example Financial Times, 14 October 2002, “Bad debts, falling capital, dismal profits”  
2 The precise definition of financial stability is still subject of debate. Padoa-Schioppa (2003) provides a 
rather broad and general definition of financial stability as “a condition where the financial system is able 
to withstand shocks without giving way to cumulative processes which impair the allocation of savings to 
investment opportunities and the processing of payment in the economy.” 
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for investors and other market participants and supervisory authorities. Higher financial 
integration and stronger (cross-country) competition only serve to increase the 
importance of financial stability analysis. Traditionally, financial stability analysis of 
individual financial institutions consisted of regular on-site inspections of banks by 
regulatory authorities and the analysis of financial accounting ratios. In recent years, 
however, the use of market-based risk measures has considerably gained popularity. 
Technological progress in combination with new financial instruments facilitates 
economic and financial risk management in a globally integrated economic system by 
pricing, repackaging and transferring risks. The corresponding availability of low–cost 
and high-frequency market data on for instance subordinated debt spreads, equity prices 
and equity returns have significantly contributed to their use in financial stability 
analysis. In addition, the reliability and information content of traditional accounting 
measures is increasingly questioned. 
A relatively new financial instrument to transfer and price credit risk is the credit 
default swap (CDS). CDS offer protection on default of a credit, comparable to credit 
insurance, by requiring a regular fee to be paid, the premium or CDS spread, in exchange 
for compensation in case of default. CDS spreads are increasingly accepted as appropriate 
measures of individual bank’s credit risk. In this paper, I investigate the development and 
determinants of CDS spreads for 18 major European banks between December 2001 and 
January 2004 using daily data. More particularly, spreads are decomposed into one or 
more common factors and idiosyncratic determinants. Assuming that the CDS market 
appropriately prices each bank’s riskiness into the CDS spreads, differences between 
banks may arise from two sources. On the one hand, a bank’s risk level may be affected 
by a common (market) shock differently from other banks due to different underlying 
characteristics. On the other hand a bank’s risk level may change due to “own” shocks 
that do not influence the market as a whole. 
I demonstrate that two nonstationary common factors can be extracted from the 
data that together explain most CDS spread variation across time and across banks. The 
group of German banks plus a few Southern-European banks appear to systematically 
have high CDS spreads and to be relatively sensitive to changes in the underlying factors. 
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suggesting strong market integration. However, the quantitatively less important second 
factor has opposite effects on credit spreads of Southern European versus Northern 
European banks, suggesting some remaining country-specific or region-specific credit 
risk. Finally, I show that the first common factor may indeed be interpreted as a measure 
of market conditions as it is cointegrated with the European P/E ratio and the 2-year 
nominal interest rate.  
The paper is set up as follows. In section 2, I briefly discuss the literature with 
respect to the use of market indicators of financial risk. In section 3 I present CDS spread 
data and the proposed research methodology, while empirical results are presented and 
discussed in section 4. In section 5 I elaborate on the link between the observed common 
factor in CDS spreads and two aggregate financial variables, the European P/E ratio and 
the European 2-year interest rate. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
2. Market indicators of financial stability 
 
The idea to complement the traditional supervisory approach with market data has 
received growing attention, both in academic research and practical supervision. Market 
indicators of financial stability should react to any change in the underlying risk profile 
which they measure, be it risk specific to one bank (idiosyncratic risk), or common to all 
banks in the market (systemic risk). In practice, however, this strict distinction between 
individual risks and systemic risks is more difficult to maintain in the modern banking 
system. Banks operate more and more on an international basis, the traditional boundaries 
between activities such as commercial banking, insurance and investment banking are 
disappearing and interaction, hence mutual exposure between individual institutions, 
national markets and different types of financial institutions is rising. The increase of 
mutual exposure in combination with high volatility of asset markets as well as 
international payment and security settlement systems provides an ideal structure for the 
propagation of contagion effects.
 3 That is, a shock to one financial institution may spread 
through the global system and affect other banks’ (perceived and actual) riskiness as well. 
                                                 
3 See Hartmann and de Brandt (2000). 
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that in turn simultaneously but differentially affect implicit credit risk of individual 
banks.  In principle, any market-based indicator of an individual bank’s riskiness should 
include both the riskiness associated with direct shocks in its own operations and with 
indirect shocks to market conditions that subsequently impact on the bank’s operations 
and position.  
Initially, research with respect to market indicators of credit risk focused on 
subordinated debt (SND) issued by financial institutions, see Gilbert (1990) for an early 
analysis.  The use of subordinated debt is motivated by the higher risk-sensitivity of such 
more junior debt, since any increase in risk should first translate into higher spreads for 
the more junior debt tranches. Most importantly, the asymmetric payoff of debt 
instruments motivates its use for supervisory purposes, as it creates similar interests for 
bond investors and supervisors. Investors are exposed to all downside risk but do not 
profit from upside-gains following increased risk-taking and consequently, spreads react 
to increases in risk but behave neutrally to upside gains, unlike equity. Gropp, Vesala and 
Vulpes (2002) provide proof of the theoretical properties of the SND indicator and derive 
a pricing formula for subordinated debt, which depends on asset value, leverage and asset 
volatility. 
By now, bank subordinated debt has become a standard indicator in financial 
stability analysis. Flannery and Sorescu (1996) find that subordinated debt spreads 
overall reflect bank risk as measured by financial accounting ratios. However, this only 
holds in the absence of government guarantees to bail out banks. Recently, Birchler and 
Hancock (2004) argue that subordinated bond spreads may be distorted by other factors 
such as poor market liquidity or fluctuations in the price of market risk in some 
circumstances. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) and Hancock and Kwast (2001) 
point out additional potential problems with using subordinated debt spreads as expected 
loss indicators to investors. 
Extending the analysis to the equity market, Krainer and Lopez (2002) find that 
equity data, in particular stock returns and estimated distance to default (EDF), are also 
viable risk indicators for banks. Swidler and Wilcox (2002) broaden the set of assets to 
include equity options. They demonstrate that implied volatility is a good predictor of 
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Pointing to the low costs and high-frequency availability of such data, Swidler and 
Wilcox strongly encourage the use of implied volatility measures for supervisory 
purposes. Note that implied equity volatility is the main input to another frequently used 
measure of financial stability, distance to default, and is its main driver in the short-run. 
Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2002) present a comparison of an equity-based 
indicator (distance to default) and a bond-market related indicator (subordinated debt 
spreads). They suggest a complimentary use of both equity and bond-indicators, 
potentially in conjunction with other market or accounting data. Berger, Davies and 
Flannery (2000) provide a similar comparison. They conclude that supervisory 
assessments are much more closely tied to bond ratings than to equity market 
assessments. However, supervisory ratings have a much stronger contemporaneous focus 
than forward-looking market indicators. Also, the time-value of supervisory information 
declines and considerable private knowledge is only present immediately after an 
inspection and looses its exclusiveness rather quickly. DeYoung, Flannery, Lang and 
Sorescu (2001) arrive at a similar conclusion. Berger et al. (2000), therefore, conclude: 
“supervisors, bond market participants and equity market participants all produce 
valuable, complimentary information which may contribute to improving the governance 
of large banking organizations”. 
Recently, CDS spreads have become increasingly popular as direct and easy 
indicator of a firm’s credit risk. Theoretically, the structure of a CDS deal gives it a clear 
advantage over other assets, most importantly corporate bonds, in assessing a firm’s 
credit risk profile. Because CDS’ payoff-scheme is strictly limited to situations of default, 
CDS spreads are a direct measure of default risk. On the other hand, inferring default risk 
from corporate bonds necessitates a number of complicating assumptions and 
calculations. For instance, to extract an appropriate credit risk measure from the corporate 
bond rate, an appropriate risk free rate needs to be defined and account should be taken of 
other determinants of the bond spread such as incorporated put or call options. Research 
on CDS spreads is still limited, mostly because the CDS market has only gained a 
substantial size since the early 2000s. All studies are subject to the criticism of relatively 
low time-series and/or cross-section dimensions. Most empirical studies so far focus on 
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(2004), Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2004), Cossin and Lu (2004), and Blanco, Brennan 
and Marsh (2004). The general consensus in these studies is that CDS spreads do indeed 
price credit risk efficiently.
4 Both Blanco et al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004) 
conclude that for most firms in their sample an equilibrium parity condition holds 
between CDS spreads and bond spreads, where the CDS market leads the bond market 
with respect to price discovery. Deviations from parity do exist for some firms, however. 
Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2004) also find a pricing differential between the CDS and 
the corporate bond market for some firms and demonstrate that illiquidity in the bond 
market is the most likely reason for the observed difference in spreads. Cossin and Lu 
(2004) point to liquidity premiums, cheapest-to-deliver options and market segmentation 
to explain price differences. Zhu (2004) uses a VECM approach to examine the relative 
importance of the two markets and comes to similar conclusions.  
Few studies exist that investigate the determinants of CDS spreads. Exceptions are 
Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) and Ericsson et al. (2005). Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) use both 
firm-specific information and market information to explain CDS spreads. Significant 
firm-specific drivers of CDS spreads are its rating, asset volatility, stock price change, 
leverage and market capitalization. In addition, a higher money market interest rate – 
supposedly capturing a positive macro-economic outlook – reduced CDS spreads 
significantly. Ericsson et al. (2005) provide similar evidence that firm leverage, volatility 
and the riskless interest rate explain a significant amount of variation in the data. This 
paper is related to Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) and Ericsson et al. (2005) in that it 
investigates determinants of CDS spreads. However, both the focus and the approach 
taken are somewhat different. With respect to the focus of the paper, I only consider 
banks, while most other studies have a mix of industrial and financial firms. Concerning 
the approach taken,  I first decompose the overall variation in spreads into common 
factors and residual (idiosyncratic) noise. Second, each firm’s sensitivity to changes in 
these common factors is investigated. Finally, I show that the first common factor that 
                                                 
4 Houweling and Vorst (2001) point out that the precision of the pricing procedure depends on the rating of 
the underlying entity. Spreads for high-rated firms are more precise than those for lower-rated firms. Hull, 
Predescu and White (2004) support this finding and explain it by counter party default risk of CDS and a 
liquidity premium on the issuer’s bonds. 
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market conditions. 
 
3. Data description and methodology 
Sample banks 
The sample consists of 18 major European banks. Table 1 lists the set of financial 
institutions included in the analysis ranked in terms of assets as of early 2004. It includes 
all top-10 European banks. In addition, 16 out of the 18 banks are top-5 banks in their 
respective national market. It is thus reasonable to claim that the sample provides a fair 
coverage of the European banking market in spite of its small size. Note that the largest 
banks are particular interest due to their relatively higher contagion potential.  
Sample period 
The time-period examined runs from December 2001 to January 2004. Data are averages 
of bid and ask quotes taken from CreditTrade. CDS spreads offer protection against 
junior (subordinated debt). For two banks – notably the Spanish banks BBVA and BSCH 
CDS daily data start in May 2001. Only from December 2001 onward, CDS spreads are 
available for all 18 banks. In addition, occasionally data are missing for specific days and 
banks. Throughout the analysis, I use a balanced panel of daily data consisting of 532 
observations.  
  In table 2, I report stylised statistics for the CDS spreads per bank. Spreads are 
reported in basis points. Panel A contains information on the level of the spreads, while 
panel B has corresponding information on spread changes. Most banks experienced a 
mean spread of 40 to 50 basis points over the period, as shown in panel A. Exceptions are 
Bayerische Hypo and Commerz Bank with a mean spread of about 136 basis points and 
BSCH, Intesa and Dresdner with a spread of about 70 to 80 basis points. Standard 
deviations for most banks are around 10-20 basis points. Commerz has the highest 
standard deviation equal to 88 basis points. Generally, mean spreads and standard 
deviations appear positively correlated. Panel B shows that CDS spreads had no 
significant trend over the sample. Mean changes are all quite close to zero, especially 
when compared to their standard deviations. The majority of banks have a daily standard 
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deviation exceeds 10 basis points. 
  In figure 1, I graphically show the development of the CDS spreads over the 
sample period, split out per country. Spreads are relatively stable over 2001 and the first 
half of 2002. From the middle of 2002 till around October/November there is a run-up in 
spreads for most banks, though in different degrees.  Subsequently, spreads gradually 
decline with a new hike in early 2003 for a subset of banks. By the end of the sample, 
spreads typically have declined to levels similar to or even lower than the levels 
prevailing in 2001. Note that there seems to be considerable variation in spreads both 
within countries and across countries. Unreported results show that the existence of a unit 




It is the purpose of the exploratory analysis to decompose CDS spreads across banks into 
one or more common factors – to which banks can respond differently -- and 
idiosyncratic factors, attributable to one banks or possibly a small group of banks. Due to 
the non-stationary properties of the input data, I use the method proposed by Stock and 
Watson (1988) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) to extract common factors or trends 
corresponding to the latent risk dimensions in the data
6.  
Stock and Watson (1988) show that if a vector Xt is cointegrated, a common 
factor representation exists of the form  
 
(1)  t t t X f A X
~
1 + =  
 
Thus, if  Xt is a (px1) vector of I(1) series with cointegration rank r, then the elements of 
Xt can be explained in terms of a smaller number of (p - r) I(1) variables, ft, called 
                                                 
5 Results are based on ADF tests and are available from the author on request. Despite the substantial 
number of observations, the results have to be interpreted with caution due to the short calendar time 
(slightly over two years of data). Longer time series are needed for more reliable inferences regarding 
nonstationarity. 
6 Conventional multivariate factor analysis is theoretically inappropriate as the underlying assumption of 
stationarity does not hold. The alternative of first-differencing the data would result in a loss of  
information with respect to the data’s level-dynamics. 
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~
. Gonzalo and Granger (1995) present a 
procedure for extracting the common factors, by imposing two identifying assumptions: 
 
1) ft are linear combinations of Xt, allowing to associate the common factors with the 
observable variables,  
2) A1ft and t X
~
form a P-T (permanent-transitory) decomposition, implying that the 
common factors summarise the long-run behaviour of the original variables.  
 
On the basis of this, the factor model  t t t X f A X
~
1 + =  can be rewritten as Xt = A1 ft + A2 
zt, where  t t X f ⊥ =γ ,  t t X z ' α = and  t z X t t A X a A 2 2 '
~
= = . The routine to extract the factors 
ft is largely based on the cointegration test proposed by Johansen and Juselius (1990). 
Estimates for  ⊥ γ and  ' α are obtained by regressing ∆Xt and Xt-1 on (∆Xt-1,…, ∆Xt-q+1), 
providing residuals R0t and R1t. From the residuals the product moment matrix 
 i,j = 0,1 is formed. Subsequently, solving the equations  ∑ =
T
t jt t i R R
1 '





− S S 11 = − S S λ  and  0 10
1
11 01 =
− S S 00 − S S λ  yields eigenvalues and their 
corresponding eigenvectors V and M, from which estimates of  ' α  and  ⊥ γ  are obtained. 
In practice, the analysis by Gonzalo and Granger consists of a cointegration test in 
order to determine the number of underlying common trends/factors in the data. The 
common trends are then extracted from the data in a second step. This routine becomes 
problematic, however, when high dimensionality datasets have to be examined, for which 
standard tests of cointegration cannot be implemented.
7 This is also the case at hand. 
In order to circumvent this problem, Gonzalo and Granger show that it is possible 
to analyse a set of variables in (logical) smaller subsystems. The authors demonstrate that 
combining the analysis of two separate subsystems yields identical results as an analysis 
of the entire system
8. In the present case, in order to handle the dimension of 18 CDS 
                                                 
7 Critical values for the cointegration rank, r, are not available for r >10 in standard tests.  
8 Granger and Haldrup (1997) point out some theoretical limitations of this procedure. They show that if the 
condition of (complete) separation between the time series in the two subsystems is not met, there is a risk 
of obtaining biased results. To mitigate this risk in practice, the common factors are both estimated using 
the entire system (based on the number of common factors determined beforehand) and using the 
subsystems. Both types of analysis yield equivalent results. Also the test of the cointegration rank in the 
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banks. Subsequently, a factor analysis is carried out for the two subsystems separately in 
a first step, resulting in a set of I (1) common factors for each subsystem. In the second 
step, a cointegration test on these common factors (extracted from the two subsystems) 
can then determine the number of common trends/factors for the entire system. Obtaining 
an estimate of the common factors for the entire system is possible since the common 
factors between the I (1) factors of the two subsystems will be the factors driving the 
whole system of variables in the long run, i.e. the common trends underlying the data of 
each indicator, according to Gonzalo and Granger. Stated differently, the common factors 
of the two subsystems contain the aggregated information on the underlying dimensions 
of the two subsystems. Combining these common factors in a second common factor 
analysis merges this information and yields a new set of common factors that capture the 
underlying dimension of the entire dataset (for each indicator).  
By means of this procedure, a decomposition of the data into a common (non-
stationary) and a specific (stationary) dimension can be achieved - reflecting the common 
and specific risk level. The extracted common trends capture the common long-run 
characteristics of the banks’ time series and reflect the latent dimension(s) that underlie 
the data. It is expected to yield a decomposition of the risk captured by the indicators into 
a common (systemic) and a bank-specific (idiosyncratic) dimension and should thus 
permit an analysis of the forces driving risk (and return) of CDS spreads.  
 
4. Results  
 
Using the procedure described above yields two non-stationary common factors/trends 
for the CDS spreads.
9 In figure 2, both factors – standardized at a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one – are presented. The first factor captures the general pattern that 
is present in all CDS spreads across banks. It accounts for 88 percent of total variation in 
the system. Factor loadings for individual banks are invariably very high. Apart from 
                                                                                                                                                   
subsystems is repeated using different combinations of banks in the subsystems. This does not affect the 
results. Overall, I feel confident that the procedure proposed by Gonzalo and Granger is valid here.  
 
9 Unreported unit ADF root tests do not reject the unit root in these series. 
  11three German banks – Bayerische Hypo, Commerz and Dresdner – these are above 0.90. 
One might interpret this as the overall market factor.
10 The second factor that only 
explains about 7 percent of total variation has quite different characteristics. It has a 
trough in 2002 and a peak in the first half of 2003. All German and UK banks plus the 
Dutch ING load positively on this factor, while all French, Spanish, Italian and Swiss 
banks plus the Dutch ABN Amro load negatively. Broadly speaking, it suggests a 
difference in risk behaviour between banks in Southern Europe as compared to Northern 
Europe.  
The simple level regressions in Table 3 confirm the story. In the table, White’s  
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses. Note that Johansen-
Juselius cointegration tests indicate cointegration between the two common factors and 
each individual bank’s CDS spread.
11 The regressions therefore may also be interpreted 
as cointegration vectors. 
A few important observations stand out. First, for most banks the coefficient on 
the first factor is between 10 and 20. For six banks, a considerable higher sensitivity is 
estimated. This is the case for all four German banks – though to a different degree – plus 
the Italian Intesa bank and the Spanish BSCH. Note that the German banks, together with 
Intesa and BSCH also have the highest average spreads over the sample period. Second, 
apart from the geographical pattern in coefficients for the second factor that has already 
been discussed, coefficients on the second factor are especially large and positive for all 
German banks apart from Deutsche Bank, and relatively large and negative for the two 
Spanish banks BBVA and BSCH. Note that the German banks, together with Intesa and 
BSCH also have the highest average spread over the sample period. 
Overall, the results suggest that the market as a whole largely moves together. 
That is, overall market conditions appear to be the main driver of the required credit risk 
premium for each bank. No evidence is found for the existence and importance of major 
idiosyncratic events (shocks) that influence individual banks’ credit risk. On the other 
                                                 
10 Obviously, in light of the small size of the sample, the term “market risk factor” has to be used with 
caution. However, with 20 large European banks in the sample, it nonetheless captures a reasonable share 
of the European market. The term “market risk factor” will thus continue to be used.  
11 Given the construction of the factors, this is not surprising. Alternatively, I performed a standard 
principal components analysis. The first two principal components are virtually the same as the two 
common factors and are non-stationary. The next four principal components are all stationary. 
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Especially the German banks and some Spanish and Italian banks have a substantially 
higher average CDS spread and a substantially higher sensitivity of the required spread 
with respect to changes in market conditions than the other banks in the sample. Finally, a 
second – quantitatively less important – factor driving credit spreads distinguishes 
between Northern European (UK and Germany) and Southern European (Spain, Italy, 
France and Switzerland) banks. The evidence for Dutch banks is mixed in this respect. 
On the one hand, the evidence strongly suggest that the European banking has 
become quite integrated, especially for the group of major international banks that is 
considered in this analysis. Overall European market conditions that may be captured in 
the first common factor are the dominant factor behind changes in credit risk. On the 
other hand, significant differences exist in the degree to which individual banks’credit 
risk premium respond to these market conditions. Here, a country dimension seems to be 
present. Especially the large German banks are more sensitive to the overall common 
factor than banks from other countries. The existence of a second nonstationary common 
trend that roughly separates Southern European from Northern European banks is an 
additional indication of incomplete market integration. 
In Table 4, I report additional evidence on the dynamics of changes in credit 
spreads. For each bank the change in the spread has been regressed on the 
contemporaneous changes in the first factors and the (unrestricted) lagged levels. The 
regression has the following form: 
 
(2)  ∆cds = α0 + α1 ∆factor1 + α2 ∆factor2 + α3( cds-1 – α4 factor1-1 – α5 factor2-1) 
 
where ∆ represent the first difference operator, cds is the spread for an individual bank 
and factor1 and factor 2 are the two extracted common factors.  This allows the 
estimation of the speed of mean reversion (α3) in credit spreads to their long-run trend. 
The overall evidence is consistent with table 3. Sign and magnitude of the coefficients 
corresponding to the lagged level of the common factors in table 4 is close to those in the 
cointegration regressions in table 3. The error correction coefficient (α3) is around -0.10 
for most banks, suggesting that about 10 percent of a deviation from the long-run 
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contemporaneous change in one of the factors on the spread is of the same order of 
magnitude as the long-run effect. This suggests that the gap between the long run credit 
spread level as determined by the nonstationary common factors and the actual spread 
may be primarily driven by stationary firm-specific factors.   
 
5. What’s Behind the First Common Factor? 
 
In the discussion so far, I have assumed that the first common factor essentially captures 
overall market conditions. I primarily based this assumption on the consistently high 
positive loading of each and every individual bank’s CDS spread on the factor. It is hard 
to imagine how a series of independent idiosyncratic shocks originating from different 
banks could lead to such synchronized behaviour of all banks in the market. In this 
section, I explicitly investigate whether it is possible to link the first common factor to a 
number of exogenous aggregate economic variables. This allows a closer analysis of the 
market risk factors and potential identification of the forces driving market risk. Due to 
the relatively short sample-period, the variables used for this purpose need to have a daily 
frequency, corresponding to the CDS spread data. This leaves only financial variables as 
potential candidates. In the subsequent analysis, I use three key aggregate financial 
variables
12: 
-  the Euro-Area 2 year nominal interest rate  
-  the P/E ratio of the DataStream European Equity market index  
In a first pass through these data, I perform unit root tests on the two individual series.  
For neither of these series the unit root is rejected. Subsequently, I perform a Johansen-
Juselius cointegration test between the first common factor and the above two aggegrate 
financial series. The Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating equation at both the 
5% and 1% levels with normalized cointegrating coefficients of 0.83 (standard error 0.07) 
for the P/E ratio and –1.80 (standard error 0.20) for the nominal 2-year interest rate. That 
                                                 
12 All variables are taken from Datastream. Using 3 month rates, and 2-year and 10 year bond rates, I 
experimented with different combinations of yield curves and interest rate levels to be included in the 
analysis. The results are qualitatively invariant to the choice of variables.  
  14is high European price earning ratios reduce the CDS spreads, while a high nominal 
interest rate increases the CDS spread for all banks. Note that the direction of the interest 
rate effect is opposite to the one found by Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002).  
A corresponding cointegration test between the second common factor and the 
P/E ratio and the nominal 2-year interest rate did not indicate a cointegrating relation 
between these three variables.  It suggests that more research is required to determine the 
drivers behind the second common factor (that split the group of European banks roughly 
in two different groups). 
Overall, the evidence supports the interpretation of the first common factor as an 




Financial stability is a major concern for market participants and supervisory authorities 
alike. Banks play a major role in the global financial system and have become more 
interconnected over the last decades, due to deregulation, liberalization and technological 
progress. The creation of the internal European market for the purpose of higher 
competition and efficiency has added to these developments. However, it has also raised 
new questions on the system’s fragility and potential contagion.  
  Increased freedom of operation due to liberalization and deregulation has 
therefore also resulted in increasing attention for monitoring and supervision. Market 
indicators of financial risk play an increasingly important role in this respect due to their 
real-time availability and their efficient reflection of all available information. The 
market for credit default swaps has started to take a central place as it provides an 
efficient way to transfer and price credit risk.  Moreover, CDS spreads provide a direct 
and easy measure of an individual bank’s credit risk. Assuming that the CDS market 
appropriately prices each bank’s riskiness into the CDS spreads, differences between 
banks may arise from two sources. On the one hand, a bank’s risk level may be affected 
by a common (market) shock differently from other banks due to different underlying 
characteristics. On the other hand a bank’s risk level may change due to “own” shocks 
that do not influence the market as a whole. 
  15In this paper, I have focused on the development and determinants of CDS 
spreads for 18 major European banks between December 2001 and January 2004 using 
daily data. More particularly, spreads are decomposed into two common factors and a 
remaining group of (stationary) idiosyncratic determinants.  I have demonstrated that two 
nonstationary common factors can be extracted from the data that together explain most 
CDS spread variation across time and across banks. The group of German banks plus a 
few Southern-European banks appear to systematically have high CDS spreads and to be 
relatively sensitive to changes in the underlying factors. The dominating first common 
factor impacts on all banks in a similar direction, suggesting strong market integration. 
However, the quantitatively less important second factor has opposite effects on credit 
spreads of Southern European versus Northern European banks, suggesting some 
remaining country-specific or region-specific credit risk. Finally, I show that the first 
common factor may indeed be interpreted as a measure of market conditions as it is 
cointegrated with the European P/E ratio and the 2-year nominal interest rate.  
In my view, the results of this first exploratory analysis of the data yield 
interesting and promising results. Some questions remain for future research, however. 
Most importantly, I have paid no attention as yet to individual bank characteristics, such 
as ratings, leverage, stock return volatility etc that have been shown to play a role in the 
pricing of credit risk in related research. Possibly, differences in these characteristics 
across banks may explain their differential sensitivity to the common market shock – that 
in turn reflect overall European stock and bond market developments. Also, further 
analysis in this direction may shed additional light on the determinants of the second 
common factor that appears to differentiate between Southern and Northern European 
banks. Finally, extending the dataset both with respect to the number of banks and the 
sample period considered is important to determine the robustness of the current results. 
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  18Table 1: Banks and their relative market position 
Name  Country  European rank 
(total assets) 
National rank (total 
assets) 
UBS AG  Switzerland  1  1 
DEUTSCHE BANK AG  Germany  2  1 
BNP PARIBAS SA  France  3  1 
BAYERISCHE HYPO-UND VEREINSBANK AG  Germany  4  2 
BARCLAYS BANK PLC  United Kingdom  5  1 
ABN AMRO BANK NV  Netherlands  6  1 
SOCIETE GENERALE  France  7  4 
ING BANK NV  Netherlands  8  2 
COMMERZBANK AG  Germany  9  3 
DRESDNER BANK AG  Germany  10  4 
LLOYDS TSB BANK PLC  United Kingdom  15  4 
BANCO SANTANDER CENTRAL HISPANO SA  Spain  16  1 
INTESABCI SPA  Italy  18  1 
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA SA  Spain  21  2 
CREDIT LYONNAIS  France  24  8 
UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA  Italy  32  2 
SANPAOLO IMI SPA  Italy  35  3 
ABBEY NATIONAL PLC  United Kingdom  41  6 
Source: Bankscope, 2004 
 
  19Table 2: Stylised Statistics on CDS Spreads 
Bank Mean Std.  Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: CDS Spreads (levels, in basis points) 
Abbey Nat’l  46.71 17.69 23.50 102.50
ABN AMRO  47.76 20.76 23.50 120.00
Barclays 35.85 11.31 18.50 65.00
Bayer Hypo  136.02 75.90 50.50 330.00
BBVA 49.97 23.59 20.00 145.00
BNP Paribas  39.70 14.64 20.50 95.00
BSCH 84.72 56.49 24.50 290.00
Commerz 135.99 88.12 45.00 475.00
Credit Lyonn  44.40 17.00 20.00 120.00
Deutsche 54.81 25.42 25.50 15750
Dresdner 78.00 43.64 28.00 200.00
ING 44.55 14.35 24.50 85.00
Intesa 68.14 35.49 30.50 195.00
Lloyds TSB  35.31 11.36 21.00 72.50
San Paolo  45.15 14.46 22.50 95.00
Soc Gen  42.24 16.55 22.50 100.00
UBS 33.98 12.38 16.00 72.50
Unicredito 43.43 14.25 20.00 82.50
Panel B: CDS Spreads (first differences, in basis points) 
Abbey Nat’l  -0.02 2.75 -12.50 25.00
ABN AMRO  -0.06 2.89 -17.50 22.50
Barclays -0.01 1.61 -8.00 16.50
Bayer Hypo  0.07 10.10 -95.00 50.00
BBVA -0.06 3.72 -42.50 32.50
BNP Paribas  -0.03 2.21 -12.50 20.00
BSCH -0.09 5.37 -32.50 37.50
Commerz 0.02 10.78 -85.00 70.00
Credit Lyonn  -0.03 2.67 -15.00 25.00
Deutsche -0.02 3.30 -22.50 32.50
Dresdner 0.04 5.11 -25.00 32.50
ING -0.03 2.35 -20.00 27.00
Intesa -0.06 5.05 -27.50 35.00
Lloyds TSB  -0.00 2.07 -14.50 17.50
San Paolo  -0.03 2.04 -15.00 15.00
Soc Gen  -0.03 2.10 -9.50 22.50
UBS -0.02 1.86 -15.00 15.00
Unicredito -0.05 2.34 -12.50 20.00
  20 
Table 3: Level Regressions (common sample) 
Bank Intercept  Factor1  Factor2  Adj  R2 
 






























































































































  21Table 4: First Difference (ECM) Regressions (common sample) 
Bank Intercept  D(F1) 
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